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 3 
1 .   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The problem of political philosophy is fundamentally about how to respond to the fact of 
diversity in human life, characterised as it is by irresoluble moral disagreement and 
inevitable conflict. While the possibility of peaceful coexistence has never been in 
doubt, diversity has long troubled philosophers and leaders alike, if in equal and 
opposite measure. The most salient features of human history are violent conflict and 
suppression of difference through coercion or conformist tendencies in the practices, 
ideologies and institutions of higher authorities, whose might more or less constituted 
right. Yet the persistent and impressive array of cultures, beliefs, ideas and lifestyles 
coexisting historically and in our present times attests to the futility of resolving moral 
conflict in such ways. New conflicts inexorably follow, often soaked in enmity and 
blood.  
The original concerns of liberalism were not with justice or social unity, but with 
authority, where it should lie and how it should be confined to find legitimate terms of a 
free society amongst diverse peoples who can live according to the dictates of individual 
conscience and peaceably coexist with others in the absence of any higher moral 
authority. This tenet then is given expression in liberal politics by the principle of 
freedom of association or dissociation and the corollary principle of mutual toleration of 
associations, which embodies a conception of the liberty of persons as that which is 
strictly a function of the political restraints that an agent faces in carrying out his desires 
within a liberal state. Liberalism construed in this way should be maximally 
accommodating of individual and group diversity and is indifferent to the internal 
practices of groups and individuals themselves, and abstemious on the values they 
espouse. For the purposes of this paper we shall call this the ‘tolerationist’ position, 
corresponding closely to Berlin’s concept of ‘negative’ liberty which, quoting Helvétius, 
recognises the free man as the “man who is not in irons, nor imprisoned in a gaol, nor 
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terrorized like a slave by the fear of punishment… it is not a lack of freedom, not to fly 
like an eagle or swim like a whale.”1 
Individual liberty thus construed says little about what constitutes the good for 
man or the manner by which he comes to formulate his desires, values and goals, which 
will invariably have a significant impact on his decision-making. It says little about the 
subtle or diffuse powers that influence the psychological construction of conscience; 
individuals may be subject to harmful, repressive or threatening group practices or 
indeed may become ‘mindlessly’ subservient to them by custom and education, wholly 
unaware of their condition. For these reasons, notable early ‘comprehensive’ liberals 
such as Kant and Mill advocated an ideal of the liberal individual, based on a substantial 
ideal of personal autonomy and individuality valorizing choice and the capacity for 
critical reflection about one’s way of life as a central public ideal. The division between 
this substantive vision of the good life and the tolerationist position has, over time, 
reached a schismatic impasse; comprehensive liberalism seems prima facie to require 
transgressing the principle of toleration if it cannot remain indifferent to groups that 
stifle the personal autonomy of its members. 
  The outcome of the debate between these two positions is not merely of trivial 
philosophical interest. While liberalism appeared in the context of the European wars of 
religion in the 17th century, it has since been transported to former colonies of European 
empires, and with those early colonists it was imposed over existing indigenous customs 
and law, without much regard for the principle of toleration. Globalisation has  
amplifying the sense of difference within increasingly multicultural political 
communities, but diluted the force of historical claims for recognition, largely been met 
with coolness by a liberal state. Toleration, we might say, has given way to efficacy. For 
this reason, in Multicultural Citizenship2 Kymlicka has sought to find a way to grant 
protection of group interests within a liberal theory that at the same time, holds personal 
autonomy as a fundamental value. To this end, he grants certain groups protection from 
external interference but refuses them the right to maintain internal restrictions that limit 
personal autonomy. This is in stark contrast to the tolerationist position most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
1 Helevetius in Berlin,  I., ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Liberty: Incorporating four essays on liberty, Isaiah Berlin and Henry 
Hardy (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002 
2 Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995 (Hereafter 
‘MC’) 
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controversially proferred by Kukathas in The Liberal Archipelago3, which sees a more 
modest role for the state and a less unified vision of political community, which implies 
that cultural groups are free to practice their traditions even if they are ‘oppressive’ from 
a liberal individual’s point of view, but what they gain in freedom to practice they 
sacrifice in legal recognition and protection from the anarchic cultural marketplace. 
 
The Thesis of this Work  
 
While both positions are characterised at a level of generality that must be further 
explained, the question this work addresses is: what are the limits of liberalism given the 
fact of diversity or, more specifically, should the liberal state interfere in the internal 
practices of groups, who restrict the personal autonomy of members or whose practices 
are ‘oppressive,’ from a liberal’s point of view? The answer this work provides is as 
follows. 
 
In a world marked by diversity, a free society is one that aims at mutual toleration of 
diverse lifestyles, in whatever form they may take. By respecting people’s interest in 
living according to (or at least not in conflict with) their moral sense or conscience, a 
free society is one that protects their fundamental freedom to associate or to go separate 
ways in circumstances of disagreement. Liberalism, when viewed as a political order 
theory rather than a substantive moral ideal of the person is represented by the principle 
of toleration rather than the promotion or transmutation of any value such as personal 
autonomy. The principle of toleration recognizes the existence of individuals and their 
propensity to associate and dissociate according to conscience as a fact, rather than the 
salience or authority of any particular individual, group or moral standpoint. Just as 
ideals of the good life are permanent objects of dispute, so too are the more substantive 
liberal ideals of freedom such as personal autonomy or liberal justice, and so it cannot be 
the concern of the liberal state to promote or be guided by these. If a free society is one 
where the freedom of association is fundamental then there is no reason on principle to 
assert any other rights or values such as personal autonomy; there is instead every reason 
to tolerate all kinds of diverse associations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
3 Kukathas, C., The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003 (Hereafter 
‘LA’) 
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The principal subject of this thesis is then to describe the place, role and limits of 
authority in a free society. Since the state monopolises the coercive instruments of 
power and, unlike other associations, has the means to restrict the liberty of individuals 
to an unparalleled extent, the view presented here resists the temptation to view the 
authority of the state as anything more than an indifferent umpire in a marketplace of 
competing values, where the rules of exchange depend on and are circumscribed by the 
acquiescence of the players. It is a minimal moral conception of the good, grounded in 
an acceptance of the importance of conscience to well-being and the aim of peaceable 
coexistence. In order to enjoy the benefits of society, groups agree to constrain their 
practices only to the extent that they conform to norms others accept as reasonable limits 
also. Those limits cannot reasonably be sectarian. 
The position assumed here can be described as a political liberalism but one that 
shares less of an affinity with its earlier champions such as Larmore, Rawls and Galston 
than with Kukathas’ somewhat controversial theory. Kukathas’ tolerationist position is a 
fearless and I think largely faithful extrapolation of the principle of toleration liberalism 
is founded upon but not without problems of its own. That it is indifferent to the 
seemingly illiberal or repressive cultural implications of it has, I think, inspired the 
deepest divisions within liberal theory.  
The chief object of attack is the ‘pro-autonomy’ comprehensive liberalism 
espoused by the likes of Kymlicka and Raz, whose influential works have shifted the 
alignment of liberal theory toward valuing a certain, liberal kind of individual in a 
multicultural society. Although they acknowledge the principle of toleration as 
underpinning liberalism and see the risks to liberty posed by coercive or manipulative 
interference of the state, they persist in valuing personal autonomy, valorising choice, as 
a principle consistent with the principle of liberty of conscience which, I will argue, 
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the state must from principle act coercively to 
advance this value. As Larmore says, “Modern culture has no room for a dichotomy 
between “in principle” and “in practice”;4 their ambivalence about this conclusion 
demonstrates the fundamental problem of including personal autonomy into the liberal 
canon. My view is that, on principle, the superior liberal approach – the only liberal 
approach, in fact – is the non-interventionist principle of toleration.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
4 Larmore, C., “Pluralism and reasonable disagreement” in Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 11 No. 1, 1994, p. 61 
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2 .   THE BASIS OF TOLERATION: CONSCIENCE 
AND AUTHORITY  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The nature of diversity is conflict and disagreement. But behind this disagreement are 
certain facts about human nature that are crucial to understanding this diversity and how 
we ought to respond to it. The first point that needs making is one of socio-political 
anthropology about that the fundamental constant that lies behind all cultural traditions; 
the existence of individuals. They make cultures and they shape them. Cultural traditions 
are not rigid nor are they enduring, precisely because they are shaped by and serve those 
who participate in their practices, just as individuals themselves serve and are shaped by 
culture. That we believe in the immutability of culture does not alter the historical fact 
that traditions are malleable and of contingent importance to mankind. Two points need 
to be made here: the first is to distinguish the non-contentious fact of diversity from its 
value. Moral differences are circumstantial rather than given, nor are their usefulness 
always apparent. Diversity is a mixed blessing. This is an important point, since its 
diversity has been valorised too by liberals like Berlin, but it’s a claim liberalism ought 
not pronounce. The second and perhaps most important point is that it is the individual, 
rather than any tradition, that is the source of diversity in society. Reasonable people 
tend to disagree about what is right. Therefore, diversity is not something that ought to 
be, or is even capable of being, undermined or extinguished.  
Liberalism’s original concern is to respond to diversity with toleration of dissent 
and difference. Toleration is an undemanding virtue since it requires little more than 
indifference or a degree of forbearance to those we disagree with and does not require 
empathy, admiration or even much concern for others, though as Walzer points out, 
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there is a continuum of stances ranging from resigned acceptance to willingness to 
respect5 that tolerance can countenance. But there are practices that we find ‘intolerable’ 
where calls for dialogue would be too demanding, and this is the occasion where 
toleration finds its necessity, embodied in resigned acceptance. Let us see why this is so. 
 
Liberty of Conscience 
 
There must be something inherent and therefore universal to the human experience that 
accounts for the fact that humans tend to differ in their moral judgments, even when 
facing the same conflict from identical cultural backgrounds. Moral disagreement arises 
chiefly where judgment must be exercised. If we consider human motivation, we should 
see quite clearly why this must be so. As David Hume notes metaphorically about 
human nature, “The Rhine flows north, the Rhone south; yet both spring from the same 
mountain, and are also actuated, in their opposite directions, by the same principle of 
gravity. The different inclinations of the ground, on which they run, cause all the 
difference of their courses.”6 For Hume, our actions are motivated by the competing 
claims of Self-Interest, Affection and Principle,7 and our judgments about how we 
should act reflect the peculiar and circumstantial context that make these concepts more 
or less important to us. Understood as such, we can recognize then that humans may act 
out of selfish, primal desires or from excessive admiration for friends or family at the 
expense of the other considerations, or in balance. But the third factor which qualifies 
these two interests, principle (or conscience), motivates according to a set of ideas or 
principles to such an extent that they may override all other motivations. 
Attachment to concepts and ideas of principle is a peculiar human trait that 
requires further analysis. Humans seem to be motivated to do what propriety dictates, or 
what is right. This is so, even when there is every opportunity to exploit opportunities 
for selfish advantages, without fear of punishment. In this way we say that humans have 
a conscience, a sense of propriety. This feature of motivation is particularly important 
because it has a peculiarly social aspect. As Montaigne suggested, “the laws of 
conscience, which we say are born of nature, are born of custom.”8 It is important to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
5 Walzer, M., On Toleration, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997, pp. 10-11 
6 Hume, D., Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) 3rd edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975 p. 333 
7 Hume, D., Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1987, pp. 54-63  
8 Montaigne, M, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. D.M. Frame, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1965 p. 83  
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note this social aspect of moral psychology because it helps explain the importance of 
morality to our humanity, being as we are creatures born into dependence within groups 
having existing values that shape our sense of propriety to prepare us for our social life. 
Notwithstanding these origins, our conduct arising from these motivations is rational, 
and importantly, there is no governing hierarchy of motivations that determines how 
best to act. Motives are, according to Hume, almost always mixed.9  
The importance of conscience to us is that we are moved to act to do what we 
think is right, which on occasion will come at the expense of our material well-being, 
our self-interest or affection, or even our very existence. This significance may be 
reflected benignly in the manner one passively follows the principle “all is for the best” 
like Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide, despite the danger it continuously places him in, 
or most terrifyingly in religious zeal or xenophobia that quickly turns neighbours into 
enemies. Conversely, the innumerable examples of mortal self-sacrifice throughout 
history demonstrates the lengths humans will go to avoid living against conscience. And 
it is not contrary to reason that this is so, for as Hume famously remarked, “’Tis not 
contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the world to the scratching of my finger” 
nor is it “contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness 
of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.”10 
It is perhaps most important to recognize the pre-eminence of conscience as a 
motivating interest, because conscience is not only one motivation to guide our actions, 
but that motivation which we think ought to guide our actions. We are ruled by this 
moral sense, of what is right and wrong, which is wholly particular to us as individuals 
and which will not only sometimes trump other motivations, but delineate the extent to 
which we may act for self-interest or affection, and not the other way round. The bounds 
of what our moral sense prescribes are such that when we transgress it, we feel guilt or 
shame if we cannot justify why these bounds were transgressed. 
We are moved to act rightly or with propriety because it must be of ultimate 
value to us, if we accept our fate to live and cooperate in a shared, social world. As 
Kukathas I think rightly notes, “[I]f there are any basic interests, that interest is at a 
minimum, an interest in living in accordance with the demands of conscience. For 
among the worst fates that a person might have to endure is that he be unable to avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
9 Hume, D., Political Essays, K. Haakonsen (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994 p. 56 
10 Hume, D., Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) 2nd edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, Book II, p. 416 
 10 
acting against conscience- that he be unable to do what he thinks is right.”11 Thus our 
interest is not merely in preserving our physical existence but our mental life also; the 
greatest torments a person may suffer are not only physical but those that torment our 
conscience. In George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty Four, Winston Smith’s true suffering 
follows not from his physical torture but from denouncing his lover to the state, to suffer 
the same fate. What humans find hardest to endure is the anguish of acting against one’s 
conscience. The above examples show that conscience can be a more important motive 
than the fear of death and thus a more important ultimate consideration than death, for it 
comprehends values more important than mere existence and for some, the penalties of 
transgression are explicitly far worse, e.g. eternal damnation. 
The importance of conscience then is not merely in its capacity to motivate, but 
in the value of acting rightly. It is perhaps the highest value of all, encapsulated in the 
maxim ‘it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong,’ expressed in Plato’s Gorgias. We 
may have an interest in happiness or flourishing, but these cannot be the primary 
interests, since living according to right conduct is the conditio sine qua non of 
happiness or flourishing, giving meaning to one’s life.  
 
Conflict of values and the burdens of judgment 
 
It may be objected that our interest lies not in being able to do what is right, but in 
actually being right.  But this is too demanding, because as individuals we must judge 
what we ought to do in light of our other motivations, which are unique and 
circumstantial, and in consideration of how others might expect us to act. We are faced 
with what Rawls calls the ‘burdens of judgment’, citing a number of factors that render 
impossible our hope of finding agreement in all cases what the right thing to do might 
be. In a non-exhaustive list, he points out the following difficulties, which I won’t repeat 
in its entirety:  
“a. The evidence – empirical and scientific– bearing on the case is conflicting and 
complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate.   
b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may 
disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
11 Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago, p. 55 
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c. To some extent all our concepts, and not only our moral and political concepts, are 
vague and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we must rely on 
judgment and interpretation (and on judgments about interpretations) within some range 
(not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ. 
d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh 
moral and political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up 
to now; and our total experiences must always differ…”12 
 
It is evident then that reasonable persons are unlikely to always affirm the same moral 
standpoint and to the extent that they do, they are just as likely to differ in the vaguer 
aspects of it. Rawls goes on to say that these burdens of judgment are “of first 
significance for a democratic idea of toleration,”13 because we recognize that others, like 
ourselves, are subject to these burdens and it is therefore through a process of reason that 
people come to differ. In a modern and increasingly complex society the burdens of 
judgment fall ever more heavily upon the individual to assess what his duty is. When 
ideas clash, we are faced with moral complexities that cannot be easily resolved. But, it 
might be objected, why should we respect another’s judgment about truth, if we disagree 
with it? As Rousseau put it, “It is impossible to live in peace with those one believes to 
be damned.”14 This point leads us to what is so important about the pre-eminent value of 
conscience in establishing the principle of toleration: we must recognize others as 
having the same interest in being able to act according to conscience and, since we are 
unavoidably situated amongst others who make similar claims of conscience that 
inevitably conflict, we must also have an interest in resolving conflicts in a way that 
does not threaten our liberty of conscience. So to Rousseau’s rejoinder we might 
respond that, as moral agents, we recognize that behind our disagreements lies a 
principle of, what Larmore calls ‘equal respect’, that “however much we may disagree 
with others and repudiate what they stand for, we cannot treat them merely as objects of 
our will, but owe them an explanation for those actions of ours that affect them.”15 This 
implies not that we respect their beliefs, but recognize that they have a conscience and, 
in exercising the burdens of judgment, are responsible for their actions. We respect the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
12 Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2005,  p. 56 
13 Rawls, Ibid., p. 58 
14 Rousseau, J-J, Rousseau’s Social Contract, with an Introduction by Charles M. Andrews, M. Walter Dunne, Washington 1901, 
CHAPTER VIII.: Civil Religion. 
15 Larmore, C., Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992, p. 62 
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fact that they have beliefs, as we do, though we may disagree with those beliefs or the 
manner in which they inform their actions. Larmore further points out that “respecting 
another belief implies recognizing that from his perspective, it was justifiably his, 
whether or not we can imagine sharing his perspective… the important point is that to 
the extent that we hold on to our own perspective, we can respect his views without 
sympathizing with them.”16  
Equal respect is a respect for persons; it is an attitude involving recognition of 
our having the capacity to have a moral sense of what is right and an interest in acting 
accordingly, even if we sometimes (or often) act wrongly. In such circumstances, we 
may be subject to praise or blame, but that does not bear on the recognition that one has 
the faculty to consider what he ought to do. In exercising judgment according to 
conscience, we belong to a tradition, which others recognize and authorize. Others are 
due equal respect by virtue of their interest in working out and being responsible for a 
coherent moral standpoint; it matters not how they exercise this capacity. So, even blind 
conformists or unreflective persons who live an ‘unexamined life’ can be said to have a 
moral personality that is to be respected, an integrity which ought to be recognized.  
 
The freedom to exit and the principle of toleration  
 
On this account of conscience and the burdens of judgment, the principle of toleration is 
the political ideal that best reflects the fact that we are incorrigibly separate. Following 
the conflicts of the Reformation, the role of the state was redefined so as not to promote 
a particular conception of the good since, for Locke, “[n]either the right, nor the art of 
ruling, does necessarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of other things; and 
least of all of the true religion.”17 The state, is in no position to arrogate to itself 
authority over matters moral or spiritual, since it never was conferred such jurisdiction 
nor could it justifiably claim incorrigibility. For Locke, it follows from this that the first 
principle of a free society recognized liberty of conscience: “[t]he care therefore of every 
man’s soul belongs unto himself, and is to be left unto himself… No man can be forced 
to be rich or healthful, whether he will or no. Nay, God himself will not save men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
16 Ibid., p. 63 
17 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. by Ian Shapiro, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 2003 [1689], p. 230 
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against their wills.”18 Mill extended the Lockean basis of liberty of conscience beyond 
the conception of the self in spiritual terms to a political conception, stating that  “[i]n 
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”19 He also signaled 
that the proper boundary between the public and private was absolutely delimited by 
individual conscience, not only because of individual sovereignty but also because 
“[society] cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so 
lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom.”20 Recognition of this fact suggests that 
the appropriate starting point for political philosophy is the individual rather than any 
group.  
When we speak of a liberal society, we are speaking of the coexistence of 
individuals where the legitimacy of any authority to arbitrate over conflict rests on the 
acquiescence of its diverse subjects rather than on a set of substantive moral 
commitments. The first corollary of recognizing the liberty of conscience is that 
individuals must be free also to associate and more importantly, dissociate from groups 
whose values they can or can no longer abide. Since different views may each be 
‘reasonable’, rooted as they are in the Humean conception of moral motivation and the 
desire to live a meaningful life according to conscience, moral conflict is unlikely to be 
resolved except by the interference of the state in moral matters, which is, as mentioned, 
outside its jurisdiction.  
In this way, liberalism as a doctrine of toleration is an ‘order theory’, rather than 
a comprehensive theory of the good, and one which recognizes that people are in 
principle free to move from the jurisdiction of one authority to another. It follows from 
an acceptance of reasonable disagreement that citizens cannot base political principles 
on their own view without prejudicing the interests of others and therefore should seek 
to find “a core, minimal morality which reasonable people can share, given their 
expectably divergent religious convictions and conceptions of the meaning of life.”21 
Valuing liberty of conscience and aspiring for peaceable coexistence means we must 
accept this minimal moral foundation of the state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
18 Ibid., p. 228 
19 Mill, J.S., On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. by John Gray, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991,  p. 14 
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Thus, a state’s promoting or acknowledging certain values as more favourable 
than others would be unacceptable to those who have not freely chosen or who may 
strongly disagree with their ascribed value. Mill, in a classic statement on the limits of 
state interference, stated the principle thus: “The only purposes for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant”.22 To treat one otherwise is to treat one as a child or a malleable object and it is 
in this sense that the principle of toleration stands directly opposed to paternalism, which 
Kant remarked is the greatest despotism imaginable. 
A key point to make here though, is that toleration, as a political ideal, does not 
require associations to tolerate dissent in their midst. Since all membership of 
associations is ultimately voluntary (though it may not be ‘chosen’ - we may be 
historically situated within a group or sociologically disposed to remain - we are free to 
exit, rendering continued association voluntary) an association may restrict its practices 
and its membership accordingly. This is principally what freedom of association (cf. 
exit) entails, since it affords individuals the freedom to associate with others, to adopt 
values and to enforce those values to the exclusion of others in accordance with the 
conscientious dictates of its remaining members. Toleration means that that association 
must not impose its views on other associations through exercising state power, nor 
restrict an individual’s right to exit. A liberal society embodying the principles of 
freedom of association and mutual toleration may then contain illiberal communities and 
in which individuals may find themselves living lives that, from a pro-autonomy 
advocate’s point of view, may be repressed or servile; it is nonetheless liberal. 
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3. FREEDOM FROM CULTURAL OPPRESSION  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 It is at this point, having marked the basic justification for liberal toleration and 
earmarked its implications, that we are confronted with the problems suggested of it by 
Kymlicka and others who share the Millian view of humans as rational revisers, 
requiring a capacity to choose their ends from a broad range of options. Further, that 
conscience is ‘born of custom’ raises a number of problems if liberalism aims at freeing 
individuals from coercive or manipulative oppression, both psychologically and 
physically. For these thinkers, to live according solely to the demands of custom is to 
live under a different, more insidious kind of despotism. Kymlicka’s theory is a 
complicated one and there are several points that he makes that must be addressed in 
turn before we can assess the validity of his claims for minority rights and the 
recognition of the value of personal autonomy. 
 
Group rights and rational revisers 
 
Kymlicka holds that the liberal view “insists that people can stand back and assess moral 
values and traditional ways of life, and should be given not only the legal right to do so, 
but also the social conditions which enhance this capacity.”23 For comprehensive 
liberals, the good life is grounded not merely in liberty of conscience but in personal 
autonomy; being able to assess what gives life value through the distribution of an array 
of resources and liberties necessary to help an individual live without fear of 
discrimination or punishment, and being given the freedom to question those beliefs by 
having the “conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views about the 
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good life, and an ability to examine these views intelligently.”24 Kymlicka’s view is that 
being able to assess the value of one’s beliefs demands some recognition of the 
importance of ‘societal cultures’ to individuals due to our attachments to them, the 
importance of culture in our lives and their historical claims. For Kymlicka, the liberal 
ideal of a society of free and equal persons is one where the relevant ‘society’ for most 
people “seems to be their nation” and therefore “the sort of freedom and equality which 
matters most to people is freedom and equality within one’s societal culture.”25 He 
boldly asserts that the nation or societal culture has generally been accepted as the basic 
unit of political theory and claims, quoting Yael Tamir, “‘most liberals are liberal 
nationalists’ – that is, liberal goals are achieved in and through a liberalized societal 
culture.”26 In respect of the weight of recent liberal theory being on his side, he may be 
right; there is then a pressing need to assess whether Kymlicka’s arguments are 
defensible within the liberalism I have described.  
The key concerns for Kymicka are both cultural disadvantage, particularly of 
“national minorities” in the cultural marketplace, and cultural oppression of individuals 
within cultural groups. He argues that relying on the right to exit to protect members of 
illiberal groups, to be effective, presupposes a capacity for personal autonomy, i.e. 
adequate options and choices. Further, what he wants is a diversity not merely amongst 
cultural groups, but within them as well, which again makes the case for personal 
autonomy as a moral and political ideal. He claims in support of this, that “liberalism is 
committed to (perhaps even defined by) the view that individuals should have the 
freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the traditional practices of their 
community, should they come to see them as no longer worthy of allegiance.”27  
To this effect, individual freedom of choice and personal autonomy are to be 
promoted, i.e. form part of state policy. Kymlicka’s claim rests on the view that “liberal 
tolerance protects the right of individuals to dissent from their group, as well as the right 
of groups not to be persecuted by the state,”28 and thus commits the liberal state to 
personal autonomy – taking on the burdens of gaining knowledge, reflecting on motives 
and interest, criticizing principles, predicting outcomes, etc – in order that that we may 
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find meaningful ways of life within our societal culture, or to dissent from it. He informs 
us that it is an “unrelenting commitment to individual autonomy [which] is intolerant of 
non-liberal groups”29 because, he says, it is only through a commitment to personal 
autonomy that we can guarantee liberty of conscience. If we want to defend the 
individual right to dissent, we must, he claims, “go beyond the need for group tolerance 
and give some account of the value of endowing individuals with the freedom to form 
and revise their final ends.”30 This view of autonomy can be characterized as a strong, 
‘Enlightenment’ autonomy akin to the Kantian or Millian view or in contemporary 
terms, with Raz, Crowder and Fitzmaurice. It is important at this juncture that we ask 
whether he is right to conflate the freedom to exit with this stronger kind of choice, 
embodied in the concept of personal autonomy, and if not, is it necessary to Kymlicka’s 
broader aim of identifying group rights to maintain an allegiance to personal autonomy? 
  
Responsibility and personal autonomy  
 
The first idea that must be questioned is that people must be able to rationally assess and 
revise their ends. At best, we ought to say that some people may have an interest in 
doing so, but it would be wrong to generalize from such interests to describe human 
interests more broadly. The reason why this is so is that our lives may not always go 
better for being able to rationally revise our ends if, for instance, we are so deeply 
committed to a certain end. We may frame this by distinguishing between ‘moral’ 
autonomy and personal autonomy; a freedom to exit implies a capacity for autonomy 
only as, according to Galston, “a more modest conception of autonomy as freedom of 
choice” to exit or stay, in contrast with a “Socratic/Millian ideal of autonomy, 
understood as rational reflection and self-creation”31. This modest ‘moral’ autonomy 
equates to the liberty of conscience, the burdens of judgment and the freedom to exit at 
the heart of the tolerationist position. This distinction is avoided by Kukathas and the 
reason is obvious: conceding the existence of ‘autonomy’ in even this modest form 
might imply that it is different to personal autonomy only in degree, leaving the 
tolerationist position susceptible to the criticisms posed by autonomy advocates. To this 
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extent, I agree that one must be extremely cautious in drawing too strong an inference 
from recognizing moral autonomy, for it is certainly not the same thing as the stronger 
personal autonomy demanded by Mill, Kymlicka and others which, although desireable 
from a comprehensive liberal point of view, seems too demanding to be a necessary goal 
of state policy because firstly, as Johnston rightly points out, it assumes that “a life of 
personal autonomy is intrinsically superior to relatively nonautonomous ways of life”32 
and secondly, seems to place too great a burden on liberty of conscience.  
To see this more clearly, let us regard the connection between the concept of 
freedom as individual sovereignty according to conscience (that leads to the principle of 
equal respect for persons), and the imputation of moral responsibility. On this point we 
may be able to more clearly ascertain the connection between the freedom to exit and the 
concept of moral autonomy, as distinct from personal autonomy. As Pettit assiduously 
states, “[W]herever there is an obligation imposed on a subject, it is assumed that the 
person has the capacity to discharge that obligation. You are a free agent and your action 
is a free action just to the extent that you are capable of being held responsible in the 
relevant choice. More specifically, you are free just to the extent that you are capable of 
being held responsible.”33 Being able to choose, makes a man capable of being held 
responsible and worthy of equal moral respect, but it is not enough to count as taking 
responsibility; this involves attempting to discern what one should do, which adds the 
additional burdens of judgment. Being fit to be held responsible means being fully 
qualified to receive whatever praise or blame is on offer, and it is principally because 
man has the capacity to act according to his motives, however minimally or vaguely 
discernable, that he stands under an obligation to take responsibility for them. We can 
see why neither children nor madmen have moral responsibility imputed to them; the 
former lack (as a question of degree) the requisite faculty of reason while the latter lack 
the freedom of choice by virtue of some compulsive pathology.  
It goes without saying that a person may take responsibility for their actions and 
nevertheless act wrongly. A responsible individual is not responsible because he acts 
rightly, but because he has the capacity to determine what he ought to do and to be 
responsive for his action. This does not mean that he must be actively engaged in a 
never-ending process of investigation and reflection. As Dworkin puts it, “no one can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
32 Johnston, D., The Idea of a Liberal Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p. 98 
33 Pettit, P., A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 12 
 19 
put everything about himself in question all at once.”34 What is relevant is that one 
recognizes that he is bound by moral constraints but that he alone can judge how he 
ought to act. This may be active or a passive activity. This is what Pettit means when he 
attributes responsibility (and therefore moral autonomy) to those who are relationally 
‘discourse-friendly’: “we may each address each other in a reason-giving, reason-taking 
way. And that this is so is a mattered of common or shared understanding… The non-
discursive activities in which we routinely involve ourselves do nothing to obstruct or 
jeopardize, restrict or raise the costs of discoursing together in that way.”35 So, the 
imputation of responsibility is a mutual recognition of our conformity to the norm of 
rational conversation, being responsive to others for our judgments and actions, and 
worthy of respect on this basis.  
The question posed by the concept of autonomy to be raised here is exactly how 
deeply we ought to inquire into the bases of judgment that an individual makes. Our 
account of liberty of conscience regards the exercise of judgment as being prima facie 
internal to the person, whatever considerations the individual may follow, provided that 
the individual’s ability to judge and act is protected from coercive interference by 
affording him the freedom of exit. The concept of personal autonomy is more 
demanding. The fully autonomous man arrives at moral decisions not because he has 
been told to do it or blindly follows custom, but because they are truly his own, gained 
through critical inquiry from an abundance of evidence. He is not subject to the 
authority of another. This relates to our discussion of responsibility in an important way; 
our ‘discourse-friendly’ assignation, our mere capacity and interest to judge for 
ourselves what we ought to do and be responsive to others for our actions, renders us 
pro tanto responsible and we cannot give it up entirely. This position is, as Larmore 
notes, mirrored in the legal doctrine of “objective liability”, whereby the motivational 
state of the ‘average man’ serves as the standard for whether certain acts can be the 
object of punishment (or praise, as may be the case in a non-legal context).36 But we 
may refuse to acknowledge our responsibility either volitionally or by virtue of 
circumstances that make us unaware of our moral condition. As Wolff puts it, “[A]ll 
men refuse to take responsibility for their actions at some time or other during their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
34 Dworkin, R,  ‘Liberal community,’ in California Law Review, Vol. 77 No. 3, 1989, p. 489 
35 Pettit, op. cit., p. 69 
36 Holmes, O. W., The Common Law, Harvard University Press, 2009, Lecture 2. 
 20 
lives, and some men so consistently shirk their duty that they present more the 
appearance of overgrown children.”37 While personal autonomy is the taking of full 
responsibility, one may equally forfeit all or part of one’s autonomy, whether by 
following the commands of another or without deliberating whether it is wise to do so, 
and still be responsible, and be held responsible, morally speaking.  
Now the distinction between moral and personal autonomy can be fully 
appreciated: An individual who has the capacity to deliberate according to conscience 
and is responsive to others for his actions cannot give up responsibility for his actions, 
even if he has subjected himself to the authority of another. He merely forfeits taking 
full responsibility qua personal autonomy. Wolff notes that “Rousseau is therefore right 
when he says that a man cannot become a slave even through his own choice, if he 
means that even slaves a morally responsible for their acts. But he is wrong if he means 
that men cannot place themselves voluntarily in a position of servitude and mindless 
obedience.”38 The freedom to exit and one’s moral sense implies only that a person 
retains his responsibility, not that they always take full responsibility, as would be the 
onerous case with personal autonomy.  
There are so many different forms and degrees of forfeiture of autonomy in our 
modern and increasingly bureaucratic and technical lives, sometimes it is not merely 
practical but reasonable, such that it seems implausible to expect even the most fully 
autonomous, self-actualised man to always take the necessary time to evaluate all the 
evidence available before deciding what to do, on all questions over all time. In ordinary 
life, we subject ourselves to the advice, guidance or prescriptions of doctors, lawyers, 
mentors or managers, sometimes with moral deliberation, other times not. In political 
life this is ever more apparent and thus it would be “outlandishly exigent”39 in the words 
of Appiah, to suppose it to be a political ideal. As Kymlicka infers by his ascription of 
the significance of the ‘societal culture’ to the individual, most men feel so strongly the 
force of tradition that they accept unthinkingly the claims to authority of their titular 
rulers or cultural traditions. Somewhat paradoxically then, if a fully autonomous 
person’s primary condition is to refuse to be ruled, to be the only source of authority, 
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there seems to be an irreconcilable, anarchistic tension between that authority and the 
putative claims to de jure authority of a cultural group or a legitimate political state.  
 
 
 
 
Social tyranny 
 
Returning to Kymlicka now, we must ask whether or not his argument against allowing 
groups to restrict the personal autonomy of its members but supporting group-
differentiated rights can be sustained if it provides the individual some meaningful 
respite from the background coercive or quasi-coercive aspects of an oppressive or 
illiberal culture, which are as a matter of fact salient features to the development of their 
values and goals. 
Our previous discussion connecting moral agency to equal respect and 
responsibility emphasized that one who possesses the faculties sufficient to be held 
responsible cannot repudiate responsibility at will. One’s moral agency can however be 
diminished or undermined by external factors, where there is hostile coercive 
interference against an individual’s avowable interests.40 As has already been discussed, 
one particular form of liberalism is founded on the premise that the exercise by the state 
of its coercive instruments of power is not warranted except insofar as it protects mutual 
toleration of groups and preserves the civil peace, on neutrally justifiable grounds. To 
this effect, it guarantees an individual the freedom from being coerced within society by 
guaranteeing freedom of association and exit. Deliberate coercive acts can be remedied 
by recourse to criminal justice. The relevant question we must ask here is: is this 
guarantee sufficient protection of the individual from more diffuse forms of coercion, 
which we may call cultural oppression, or more relevantly, should these forms of 
oppression be considered as actually coercive?  
Beyond what we may easily recognize as deliberate coercive actions hostile to a 
person’s sovereign interests, coercion is a notoriously nebulous concept to define in this 
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context. Mill gives us perhaps the classic statement of the connection between state 
oppression and cultural oppression: 
“…when society is itself the tyrant- society collectively, over the 
separate individuals who compose it – its means of tyrannizing are not restricted 
to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society 
can and does execute its own mandates; and if it issues wrong mandates instead 
of right, or any mandates at all in things which it ought not meddle, it practises a 
social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, 
though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of 
escape, penetrating more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul 
itself. Protection, therefore against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; 
there needs protection also against the tyranny of society to impose, by other 
means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on 
those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and if possible, prevent 
the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all 
characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own”41  
 
Cultural oppression arises from a diffuse source. No one bar of a prison cell is sufficient 
to hold a prisoner, but many bars, arranged in just the right way, can form a kind of cage 
within which one’s possibilities cannot but be constrained. If we consider, with 
Crowder, that freedom can be constrained by not only deliberate coercion but also 
poverty or ignorance, for example,42 or any number of environmental and cultural 
impediments to unfettered flourishing, then we must take the fact of cultural oppression 
seriously. To be sure, the naturalness of the beliefs we come to hold, and the way they 
are embedded in a coherent system of equivalent background values, can have the effect 
of removing a person’s motivation to examine them. As a result, if we were to 
investigate our beliefs we would discover embedded within ourselves substantive limits 
to our possible conceptions of the good, uninformed of many of the options and 
opportunities that are available to another. This is particularly problematic firstly 
because the inculcation or adoption of values is so overwhelming a developmental 
process to an impressionable naïf and, by its nature and purpose, not for (at least 
immediate) rational examination and, secondly, derives from a source that is diffuse and 
veiled in all the historical finery of native wit. If it were oppressive, objectively 
speaking, recognition as ‘oppressive’ by its subject is almost out of the question and, in 
case of any suspicion otherwise, might appear to him to be beyond his powers to change, 
or even beyond his powers to be free from. As Kernohan  points out, “[D]iffuse power 
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arises, without anyone intending it, out of the independent activities of many agents. We 
cannot impute the exercise of diffuse power to the activities of any individual agents. To 
understand the power of culture to harm, we must understand cultural power as an 
accumulative phenomenon devoid of agency.”43 So, for example, making women 
vulnerable to the power of men in a patriarchal culture is one type of harm whereby a 
woman may have socially-inculcated belief that her interests, even her worth, are 
subordinate to those of a man’s, without almost any means to recognize or alter her 
station. One can imagine a whole host of subtle inequalities or more harmful practices 
(such as circumcision and cliterodectomy, as obvious examples) that permeate cultural 
forms which, without the interjections of dissenting viewpoints, persist and are passed 
down from generation to generation. Further, dissenters may be forced to conform on 
pain of expulsion into a world they cannot easily enter.  
 
Freedom to exit and opportunity costs 
 
This is a serious criticism of a liberal theory that places toleration at the front and 
centre of political philosophy, if it means that a liberal state should be indifferent to 
these kinds of oppression insofar as it denies to groups any cultural rights by virtue of 
their traditions but affords them power over their members to suffer their practices. 
Brian Barry has called it a ‘perverse theory’ if firstly, toleration does not facilitate the 
capacity to exercise one’s freedom to exit in the kind of way presupposed by autonomy 
advocates as that which is necessary to overcome the “excessive costs”44 of exit and 
secondly, draws no boundaries on which practices imposed are legitimate and which are 
not.  
However, this argument that more needs to be added to support the freedom to 
exit to mitigate oppression must be countered in the strongest terms on principle, if 
liberalism is to remain an adequate political theory responding to the fact of diversity 
and the inviolability of liberty of conscience. That is not to deny that the freedom to exit 
may be an extremely costly exercise or that oppression may be very real or cruel. The 
point is firstly that it is the individual, not the state, who is in the best position to 
determine how the cost impacts the exercise of the freedom; secondly, that the cost has 
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no bearing on the freedom itself; and finally, once we start drawing blueprints for 
interference based on substantive conceptions of the good we are back to the original 
political problems out of which liberalism arose. 
 Before we address the most dystopic of worlds Barry envisions in his criticisms, 
let us first turn to the kinds of lives one can expect to find in a tolerationist world. An 
interesting example is that provided by Kukathas, of Fatima the Malay fisherman’s wife, 
who has no desire to leave her village since her identity is so completely bound up with 
her local customs, nor has she, it is possible, any idea of having good reason to do so by 
virtue of whatever opportunities exist therein. Now according to Kukathas’ 
understanding of the principle of toleration she is free, politically speaking, because she 
has the right to leave the group, howsoever bound up with it she may be, or ignorant of 
alternatives, lacking the desire or the means to do so easily.45  
One argument against her freedom suggests that it is problematic to judge the 
freedom of society by the freedom to exit of individuals, who are conditioned or 
socialized into conformity. They are ‘unfree’ because they are raised to have no desire at 
all to look to the other side of the fence. To this it must be conceded that our particular, 
basic goals are rarely chosen; they are acquired and our identity is, with our goals, 
intimately defined by this process. Thus, the diffuse power of cultural norms cannot 
easily be detached from those who are subjected to them. As Michel Foucault remarks: 
“all these present struggles revolve around the question: Who are we?... the 
main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much “such and such” an 
institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but rather a technique, a form of 
power. This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which 
categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to 
his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and 
which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes 
individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word “subject”: subject to 
someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by 
conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to.”46  
 
 Similarly, our expectations and our interactions with others are bound up with values 
and customs that, were we to be indifferent about or actively opposed to them, would 
nonetheless indelibly shape us. But, though our preference formation is generally 
endogenous (and I don’t think it is regrettable; it would, on the other hand, seem absurd 
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to say so from an anthropological point of view) the relevant point is that it is not to say 
that they can never be changed, now or at some later stage in life, should circumstances 
press us to change them. Freedom to exit presupposes that we are able to do so. Thus, 
Fatima would not be ‘unfree’ by virtue of her heteronomous preferences but, rather, if 
she were unable to act in accordance with her preferences.  
  As a counter, Crowder argues that the mere fact of her “acquiescence” in her 
lifestyle is not enough to underpin her right of exit: “The fact that no one is forcing 
Fatima to stay is consistent with her having no real prospect of leaving because of 
obstacles other than simple coercion. These include the costs that are often attached to 
exit, including economic and psychological costs, the risks of failure in the society into 
which one is exiting, lack of economic resources with which to make exit possible… 
[and] the kind of social conditioning that makes exit unimaginable in the first place.”47 
We can see these impediments all the more clearly if we consider that the psychological 
impediments to exercising the freedom of exit Fatima may experience are the result of 
norms that distort or restrict her free development but also create difficulties in her 
ability to survive and thrive elsewhere. According to Crowder, “Fatima is free to exit 
only in the narrowest, most formal sense, on a level with the legendary freedom of the 
poor to dine at the Ritz.”48 The problem then, the objection goes, is that the position I’ve 
defended is too minimal a conception of freedom and Galston, another pro-toleration 
theorist, agrees that genuine freedom of exit must be “more than formal”; it must mean 
that individuals have real choices when it comes to staying or going.49 A group cannot 
legitimately claim that its individual members have a right to exit merely because the 
group refrains from coercion while effectively disempowering people from either having 
the notion of their subjection or the possibility to live outside the group, keeping them in 
“a kind of mental and moral prison.”50 So, even if a capacity for personal autonomy 
were not essential to a good life or a good liberal society in general, it might be essential 
to a realistic freedom of exit. Real freedom of exit, even on Galston’s tolerationist 
account, seems to involve the capacity to stand back from the groups norms and assess 
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them critically, that is, a capacity for autonomy or, for Barry, a limit to which costs are 
legitimate and which are illegitimate, i.e. excessive costs that a group cannot impose.51   
There is certainly some truth to the proposition that, in practice, the tolerationist 
position must concede that it is possible that some groups will uphold, condone or 
promote practices that are harmful to its members, when seen from a comprehensive 
liberal’s perspective. However, I think the challenge that the principle of the freedom to 
exit alone is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of freedom,52 in the face of the 
costs of its exercise, is susceptible to some fatal objections.  
Firstly, one must not confuse the freedom to exit with the costs involved in its 
exercise. The fact that exiting a group may be risky does not alter the fact that the 
freedom to take the risk remains. We can see this clearly by analogizing with our 
ordinary professional decisions in life: if I decide to leave a well-paying job as a 
corporate lawyer after years of encouragement and training in that profession, to pursue 
a new career as a philosopher, I am both faced with the difficulties of leaving a stable 
life with its own associational goods and the anxiety of entering an entirely new, esoteric 
practice with its own alien demands and a much more fraught financial future. I may be 
resigned to remain as a lawyer because of these difficulties, but these are practical 
considerations that do not alter the fact that I remain able to take that decision, with all 
of the considered risks involved. Conversely, if I am told that a philosopher’s life is 
nonetheless better because wisdom is better than wealth, yet I have an inculcated desire 
for the latter more than the former, it would seem absurd to act on those motivations 
external to mine, whether or not it were ‘objectively’ true (proof of which may indeed 
give me the requisite internal motivation to change career). 
A further reply deals with the critical problem of how to determine what suffices 
as ‘excessive’. It is a problem that doesn’t really have a solution, which Barry 
unhelpfully makes clear,53 if one wishes to hold to any serious principle of freedom of 
association. As Kukathas notes, “[I]f the account of an ‘excessive’ cost identifies that 
cost in terms of its propensity to affect individual decision-making, it is hard to see what 
would not count as an excessive cost. If, on the other hand, the account of an ‘excessive’ 
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cost identifies cost in terms of an independent set of desiderata, those desiderata would 
then do the work of determining what kinds of associations individuals could and could 
not maintain or form; their willingness to be a part of such associations would become 
of secondary importance.”54 If that desiderata were, for example, that the individual be 
autonomous in the strong sense, i.e., fully-informed, there would have to be some 
standard by which one’s preferences could be assessed as adequate or otherwise. Which 
brings us to the denouément against both Barry’s and Crowder’s objections: if choices 
are acceptable only if they are sound according to a relevant standard, then the 
proverbial floodgates are open to allowing all kinds of individual choices to be 
investigated, assessed and possibly denied, with actual individual preferences counting 
for little.  
We will come to the question of whether such a standard is even possible, if it 
were to be warranted. The fundamental contention here is that to assume that the right of 
exit is not really available to someone for whom the costs of exit are unacceptable 
psychologically or economically, is to confuse practice with principle; for it is surely 
false to say that the right to exit ceases to exist when the practical impediments to its 
exercise are subjectively unacceptable, nor does the right imply that the costs ought to be 
feasible. A further reason why this approach is inadequate is that, if we were to employ 
some standard to make the cost of exit more feasible, we merely shift the costs onto the 
group, thereby impinging on their freedom to associate conscientiously. Thunder notes 
that, setting aside certain extreme cases of ‘mental imprisonment’ that might call for 
state intervention, “it is hardly the business of State to make exit from associations 
psychologically feasible for group members. Citizens are entitled to participate in forms 
of association that engage their minds and hearts so deeply that exit is ‘unthinkable’ to 
them.”55  
As I have already discussed, society is made up of individuals who find 
themselves, first involuntarily by birth and later by preference, under the authority and 
influence of other individuals, whose values and practices represent those of a larger 
group (the family; religion; the nation) amongst a variety of others. Each individual 
identity is in part defined by this experience, not least by virtue of his coming to have a 
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conscience. As Appiah notes, to demand that individuals be fully-informed in 
accordance with a commitment to personal autonomy is to “assign us all to undertake a 
comprehensive assessment of norms and values,” thus confusing “the job description of 
the citizen with that of the moral theorist.”56 An individual is free if they live a life they 
have not rejected and are not coerced to live a life they cannot in good conscience abide 
by.   
 
 
 
 
Heteronomous lives  
 
This conclusion is deeply troubling for autonomy advocates since for them, if the 
autonomous life is promised as the key to well-being, then Fatima commits (willfully or 
through ignorance) what Kant might have called have called the sin of a heteronmous 
life. Her life is, according to Crowder, “likely to be less satisfactory overall than an 
autonomous life”57 That is, her preferences are unsatisfactory, from a comprehensive 
liberal point of view since, as Raz tendentiously claims, autonomy “is a fact of life… we 
can prosper [in society] only if we can be successfully autonomous.”58 This position is 
claiming a great deal for the few men and women in history who have been motivated to 
live autonomously, as if a high degree of it were necessary to its worth, and grants little 
to the rest (and vastly superior in number) who, finding themselves by moral luck in 
non-liberal cultures, presumably suffered this fate despite knowing little if any 
alternative. It is far from clear that, in the case of Fatima, she is leading an impoverished 
life or needs rescuing by a liberal education. The point being made here is not of little 
importance in the scheme of this debate. It follows from my arguments that our lives are 
all more or less heteronomous. Not to take this seriously is to invite the kinds of 
liberalizing policies that, I will argue, have more insidious implications than what 
follows from accepting this fact. The critical point here is that, even if personal 
autonomy were a regulative ideal for some, the unexamined life may yet be worth living.      
Some apt though peculiar examples which, I think, demonstrate what is insidious 
in holding such a sectarian conception of the good are the following cases identified by 
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Raz to support his position advocating state-promoted personal autonomy: the man 
happily pumped with hash or another intelligent man who autonomously chooses to 
count all the blades of grass in the world. David McCabe suggests that neither could be 
thought to be leading a good life, the first because he doesn’t do anything and the second 
because what he does is pointless.59 But it of course depends on who is judging. It is in 
the eye of the beholder, so to speak, that such lives are of lesser value; to say so does not 
acknowledge, if similar cases were the product of a ‘societal culture’, that the 
curtailment of personal autonomy may be a reasonable price to pay for that group to 
acquire and preserve the goods associated with such distinctive ways of life. Promoting 
personal autonomy would interfere with these preferences. Moreover, the spectre of 
coercive state power is ever-present in such logic. Heteronomous lives do not appear to 
be particularly insidious, not least to public order (insofar as they are not revolutionary), 
and if Kant might have called such lives sinful, it remains to be demonstrated exactly 
whensoever the state (or anyone else, more to the point) acquired jurisdiction over sin, 
or other such matters of conscience. 
 
Mental Imprisonment 
 
We cannot yet move forward in our argument without acknowledging that there is a 
difference between a heteronomous life and one of ‘mental imprisonment’ or brutal 
subjection and that, in such cases, as Galston and Barry suggests, more than a mere 
formal freedom to exit may be needed. But we must move forward with caution; if the 
liberalism as I have to this point described condones any oppression, even Kymlicka 
concedes, I think rightly, that we should be wary of conceding to established authority 
the right to intervene in the ‘intolerable’ oppressive practices of minorities, because 
there is little reason to think that such power will not itself be abused; the threat of 
oppression is as likely to come from the within the community as it is from without, i.e. 
the state.60 We must distinguish a diffuse power from which we have a claim to liberty 
against, from the coercive power of the state, against which there is little escape. 
Let us now return to the metaphor of the cage. Having discussed the difference 
between the freedom to exit and the risks involved in exercising that freedom, we may 
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have to accept that one’s life within any culture is a life within a cage but, in a free 
society, it is one with an unlocked door. That the person inside is unaware of the 
existence of the door or haplessly unaware61 that it is unlocked, having grown too 
helplessly familiar or happily content with his confinement, does not derogate from the 
fact that he is at liberty to leave and is in this sense free. Left in an abstract metaphysical 
form, this argument is vulnerable to the objection, with Williams, that this ‘happy slave’ 
is paradoxical and therefore an inadequate account of freedom.62 We may, he argues, 
make them even less free if reformers inform them of what they are missing by 
remaining so confined, thereby making them discontented. While I have already 
addressed in general terms in the first chapter and throughout this work a conception of a 
free person who nonetheless may be servile from custom or deference to authority and 
have therefore refuted the existence of a ‘happy slave’ paradox, this particular claim 
deserves closer attention because Williams’ ‘happy slave’ here is a product of a 
calculated agent, a regime whose successful designs at mental imprisonment make its 
subjects ‘unfree,’ though content. Let’s revise for a moment what has been said up to 
this point: There exists diverse values and traditions that form boundaries to our 
development that are inherent to our self-understanding and a feature of our condition as 
social beings. We have developed norms, conventions and moral principles to govern 
our social interactions that mitigate against the kind of despotic or anarchic opportunism 
and injustice found in our pre-social state of nature. Liberalism does not assume as its 
purpose the liberation of each of our mental states but that people have a fundamental 
interest in living according to their existing conscience and should be free to do so and 
not subject to coercion to act against conscience. We must accept that we are all, more 
or less, raised in some variation of a cage but cannot therefore accept with Rousseau that 
one ought to be dragged out, forced to be free, as it were. That it is not locked suffices to 
describe the relevant freedom. 
Now none of this indicates that the act of persuading (as distinct from 
brainwashing, if any distinction is even possible) is coercive nor that causing discontent 
derogates from one’s freedom, and so on this point Williams’ subsidiary claim about 
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reformers is untenable. To the question of the regime as a calculated agent of mental 
enslavement, if we assume hypothetically that its psychological techniques of 
brainwashing are thoroughly effective (and neither I nor Williams wish to investigate 
how this might be proven or what it involves for the patient, cognitively speaking), we 
may nonetheless ask how ‘coercive’ is its effect if the regime is open to the possibility of 
permitting alternative arguments of interventionist reformers to be heard and, moreover, 
that their ‘slaves’ are vulnerable to discomfit by virtue of those arguments. And this is 
an important point in favour of liberal toleration in the context of securing peaceable 
coexistence amongst diverse groups. If such a regime exists outside of liberal society 
then, in accordance with the principles of international relations, there is little a liberal 
state or individual can do but attempt to persuade by diplomacy. If this kind of regime 
exists as a group within a liberal state, it is subject both to the persuasion of diplomacy 
(and the diplomacy of persuasion, for the group does not, strictly speaking, have to 
tolerate external interference) and connected to enforceable norms and rules of the civil 
peace by which the other associations agree to be bound. Even were we to assume their 
weakest application and assume also a realistic physical isolation of the group members, 
to characterize them as ‘slaves’ to ideas wholly designed by the group seems even to 
Williams “a rather objectionable fantasy”.63 And this leads to a further, more important 
point in reply to the objection that the principle of toleration is impotent in dealing with 
oppression as has been suggested to date, which Williams has foreseen:64 the practical 
reality of the modern world is that groups cannot readily live in absolute isolation 
without seceding, which has significant costs and risks to it (the issue of which I will 
return) and will have to coexist with other groups, finding some modus vivendi 
settlement, which would describe something more like the rules of the commons than 
merely a balance of power. Thus, they will have to abide by mutually agreed laws and 
internalized norms and accept that in circumstances of conflict, a third party, the state, 
has the authority to adjudicate and make determinations. Their practices and conduct 
will be in some way compromised, depending on what those norms and commons are, 
the content of which can only be speculated. Extreme cases of mental imprisonment 
would likely be addressed in this way. This is particularly important if we transpose the 
calculating agent to a more real and pervasive regime, the family. 
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The fate of children 
 
For Barry, the above arguments are simply not enough. Rather, it is “a formula for 
creating a lot of private hells,”65 since it is tantamount to licensing, for example, 
religions the right to kill apostates, which for Barry is morally indistinguishable from 
making apostasy a capital punishment.66 But worse is to come, for he claims also that 
pure toleration upholds not liberty but power, suggesting that the state has no business 
trying to save children from their parents and, if it provides an “immunity to parents to 
do things to their own children that would be illegal if they did them to any other 
children, the state is handing over power to parents in a particularly brutal and 
uncontrolled way.”67 The conclusion Barry draws is that this is tantamount to a sadistic 
license, which is, as a reductio ad absurdum, proof that the principle of toleration is 
insufficient to guarantee freedom. In his interpretation, since this theory of toleration 
cannot draw a line, everything is permitted; nothing precludes granting to parents the 
right to kill or maim their children or withhold lifesaving medical assistance in extreme 
cases or, in the less severe but no less malign case, to inadequately educate them, such 
that it would ordinarily amount to criminal neglect.68  
The state, goes the argument, must have an active role in preventing this, 
presumably from the earliest opportunity in life. To this effect, Barry advocates the 
Millian view of the freedom of association, that it protects the rights only of adults of 
sound mind who enter voluntarily and that children require additional protection: “There 
is only one stopping point [to toleration] that makes any sense: the one that says that the 
interests of children should, as far as possible, be protected by the state from abuse by 
parents”,69 since it is children who are most vulnerable to authority and the pervasive 
injunctions of customary norms, being neither ‘of sound mind’ in a moral and legal 
sense nor volunteers to their station. 
I believe this objection goes to the heart of why the classic, minimalist 
interpretation of liberal toleration invokes such vociferous antagonism from 
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comprehensive liberals, because a principle of toleration unqualified by Barry’s formula 
does indeed seem to be impotent in the face of threats to children’s well-being, however 
unlikely the most sadistic ones posited may be. But this is an important point that is 
worth taking up first, since I believe such outcomes are unlikely in any political 
settlement aiming at peaceable coexistence.  
As mentioned by way of reply to Williams, norms, conventions and rules operate 
in a society governed by mutual toleration to the effect that, as Kukathas points out, “it 
is not going to be possible for individuals or groups easily to arrogate to themselves the 
power to do entirely as they wish with others – including their children. For they will be 
bound by the norms and conventions or the laws of the communities to which they 
belong – which may in turn be shaped by requirements laid down by other associations 
of which these groups are themselves parts.””70 The more closely a group associates 
with the wider community, the more difficult it will become to impose practices that fall 
outside of those accepted as part of the legal and political order. An apt example to 
demonstrate this is the Hirani v Hirani71 decision of Justice Ormrod in the United 
Kingdom Court of Appeal, where an arranged Hindu marriage was annulled at law 
because it was entered into under ‘duress’, i.e., by fear of social ostracism, and therefore 
not voluntary, in breach of the British marriage laws. The point to glean from this 
decision is not that the group must alter its own practices, only that they cannot expect 
others to recognize them and, to the extent that they do seek legal recognition (or any 
other benefits of participation in the state), they cannot then expect immunity from its 
enforcement elsewhere. 
Thus, the more sadistic implications Barry cites, where a parent may commit 
child mutilation or infanticide with impunity are highly unlikely to be ignored or 
condoned, unless the group or the wider society deems such practices to be permissible. 
Such is the case with male circumcision within most liberal democracies (the recent 
exception being Germany, by virtue of a regional appellate court in Cologne, although 
the German parliament quickly moved to re-establish a legal basis to continue this 
practice), a practice rooted in the Abrahamic religious traditions for which there is 
strikingly little support by way of explicit law, yet it remains nevertheless tolerated. This 
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is in contrast to female circumcision, a practice deemed barbaric and a criminal offence 
in many if not most of these western countries but prevalent in Africa today.  
There is little doubt however, that many groups practice a range of anomalous 
practices for which there is no such normative consensus, from the more benign, like 
home-education in Amish communities through to more controversial practices of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses prohibiting blood transfusions, to the most objectionable practices 
(from a liberal individual’s point of view) such as ritual scarring and mutilation, abortion 
or infanticide.  
It must be said that the interests of children is a controversial issue. The 
tolerationist position relies upon the pressures of civil association more generally, rather 
than state power, to temper the practices that are perceived to be harmful. This an 
important conclusion. A defense of this kind of liberalism doesn’t propose to eliminate 
all oppression, domination or exploitation. We should agree with Hume that the 
‘circumstances of justice’ preclude such hope. Some groups will invariably be stronger 
than others and will try to take advantage of them, and some minority groups will also 
invariably suffer from some ‘cultural imperialism.’ This is not to excuse the bad 
behaviour of groups or individuals within the liberal state but to say that people do as a 
matter of fact judge badly and there is no getting away from the fact as people judge 
badly, they may act wickedly. What is not being claimed in defense of liberalism is that 
it can cure wickedness any more than it can correct the cognitive mechanisms that 
produces bad judgment and therefore does not presume there is no scope to wrongful 
conduct. But by virtue of the norms that arise from the modus vivendi, which may 
change over time according shifts in the general sentiment (such as may be the case of 
circumcision in Germany), it does not give as much scope as Barry implies. The modus 
vivendi approach has an additional advantage because to do otherwise, to license the 
state with the authority to determine what is in the best interests of children, is far more 
dangerous, perhaps fatal to the goal of liberalism, as it assumes the state will always do 
good.  
Barry’s view that groups, or parents, ought to be required to conform to 
standards set down by the liberal state to prevent them acting against the interests of 
children presents just these risks. The fact that these issues are controversial highlights 
the difficulties of his solution rather than its justification. If we look at an example of 
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one of the remotest groups in liberal society, the Amish, in the case of Wisconsin v 
Yoder72 the United States Supreme Court upheld the Amish community’s claim of 
having the right to limit the education of Amish children before the age of 16, designed 
as it was to limit the extent to which they learn about the outside world. Justice William 
Douglas in dissent took the pro-autonomy position that this effectively denied the 
children the opportunity to leave the community and Kymlicka cites this as an example 
of the deficiency in any political liberal approach that does not endorse personal 
autonomy as a standard, on the presupposition that, like Barry, this is must be a perverse 
outcome. But Barry (unlike Kymlicka) has not seen that his accusation that a pure 
tolerationist position knows not where its perverse outcomes will stop is equally 
applicable in the reverse case of granting the state authority to ‘as far as possible’ protect 
the children’s interests from abuse by parents. What kinds of rearing methods warrant 
intervention? We ought not dismiss the possibilities as so far-fetched either, if we recall 
the notorious 19th century case of the state-sanctioned abduction by the Vatican of 
Italian Jewish boy Edgardo Mortara once he’d been mistakenly baptized, which shows 
how strongly the force of policy cloaked in benevolence can blind one to gross injustice. 
The policy of the Australian government to permanently remove indigenous youths from 
their parents is another reminder of such misguided standards, but within a liberal state.  
On the issue of cultural oppression, liberalism faces a stand-off between giving 
carte blanche either to cultural groups or to the state to determine the interests of its 
members. Why shouldn’t we grant this authority to the state? In one sense, final 
authority will always rest with the state, to the extent that it embodies and enforces the 
laws needed for maintaining the civil peace. But beyond that, it seems that we go not 
only much further than the tolerationist basis of liberalism but also the pro-autonomy 
one if the state has power to intervene on the basis of very full conception of a person’s 
interests, i.e. to certain opportunities and ‘correct’ ambitions, particularly if it is assumed 
they will act rightly in furtherance of this good. 
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4.  COERCION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
 
 
 
The position defended here is based on the foundational liberal skepticism that the state 
will (or even can) act rightly in promoting a particular interest; the state can neither 
know how to act rightly, nor will it always be motivated solely to act rightly, in 
furtherance of these particular interests. Mill put it best: “All errors which [a person] is 
likely to commit against advice and warning, are far out-weighed by the evil of allowing 
others to constrain him to what they deem his good”.73  
 
The problem of state coercion 
 
Unlike Barry, Kymlicka is more hopeful in regards to the threat of oppression: “liberals 
tend to believe that cultural oppression cannot survive under conditions of civil 
freedom… because freedom of speech and association in civil society is a better testing 
ground for ideas than the coercive apparatus of the state.”74 Throughout history there 
have been countless examples of ‘benevolent intervention’ of the state, that have either 
failed because they have been indifferent to the groups who wished to live according to 
their own lights, or because they have been motivated by ulterior and sometimes more 
invidious purposes. As Waldron notes, “the reasons that governments promote 
autonomy are not exactly or simplistically identical with the value of autonomy to 
autonomous individuals”;75 it is as often the case too, that such minority groups’ 
practices are deemed oppressive or barbaric largely only by virtue of their minority, 
Other-oriented status, relative to the majority. The history of the tragic relations between 
the European Jews and their persecutors is but one obvious example of many throughout 
history.  
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 In contrast to Mill’s description of the totalizing tyranny of a society, there are 
fewer means of escape than when the state does the tyrannizing, for it has a monopoly 
on the instruments of power and, as Nussbaum insightfully notes, “when it is the 
government that sends the message, that changes the message, because government 
defines one’s life-opportunities in a pervasive and fundamental way.”76 Thus the state, 
as the last resort in claims to protection of liberty of conscience and freedom of 
association, poses a far greater threat by its adoption of particular values than a religious 
or cultural group who cannot refuse an individual his right to leave if he can no longer 
abide in its practices.  
And this brings us to a critical consideration, highlighting the importance of the 
state remaining neutral between the various diverse practices of the groups who 
constitute its polity. The knowledge of the state is fundamentally deficient to determine 
what is and what is not true (or, therefore, oppressive) or to develop any standards 
beyond the limit of what is neutrally justifiable, circumscribed by the principles of 
toleration and the goal of civil peace and security. The argument relies on the fact that 
state is too remote from its citizens to know their individual tastes, capacities, goals etc., 
that the costs to sufficiently collect and aggregate this data are prohibitive and the state 
lacks the epistemic authority to have a well-grounded theory of the good. The state’s 
decisions must be instead “grounded on general presumptions which may altogether be 
wrong and, even if right, are as likely to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no 
better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them 
merely from without.”77  
On this issue the views of comprehensive liberals begin to diverge. In contrast to 
Barry, who clearly sees a role for the state to uphold and promote comprehensive values 
implicit in his vision of the liberal individual, Crowder, Raz and Kymlicka show more 
reticence, though not convincingly so. Crowder, like Kymlicka, holds that “a 
consistently liberal-pluralist state must be prepared to defend values of diversity and 
personal autonomy, against the norms of its minority illiberal groups if necessary… I am 
concerned with those groups, including cultural and religious groups, whose norms tend 
to pervade a person’s whole life, making exit (and voice) more problematic.”78 Raz also 
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claims that the principle of autonomy “permits and even requires governments to create 
morally valuable opportunities and to eliminate repugnant ones.”79 Yet at the same time 
they seem aware of the key objections that firstly, promoting autonomy may be counter-
intuitive if inner states cannot actually be enforced80 and, secondly, that promoting 
autonomy would afford group equality not on the basis of an equal right of national 
minorities with ‘societal cultures’ to have those cultures respected, but on the basis that 
their cultural practices corresponded to those that promoted the liberal value of 
autonomy, rendering group-differentiated rights and equality a somewhat hollow, 
Pyrrhic victory.  
 
Can autonomy be enforced? 
 
To the first objection, Crowder and Raz are less convincingly against interference than is 
Kymlicka as we shall see, with respect to the means by which a state can achieve the 
goal of increasing personal autonomy. Raz notionally rejects coercion and manipulation 
as both an insult to and “symbolically and actually a threat to autonomy”81 by “reducing 
options or distorting normal processes of decision,”82 yet remains rather evasive about 
what actually constitutes state coercion or manipulation as distinct from those policies 
state may or must employ to realize the value of personal autonomy. Crowder too 
qualifies his account of an autonomy-promoting role of the state, though also rather 
vaguely, citing that, “as Kymlicka points out, heavy-handed prohibitions are unlikely to 
be the most prudent means of promoting personal autonomy and indeed will often be 
counter-productive [my emphasis].”83 There is sufficient ambiguity in Crowder’s and 
indeed Raz’s language to indicate nevertheless that they do indeed afford some scope for 
interference in promoting autonomy. 
Let us take an example of a state policy, say on taxation, that is designed to 
achieve the goal of promoting autonomy. Suppose a government imposes a levy on a 
‘depraved’ activity, such as the one given by Raz, fox hunting:84 Such a tax is merely a 
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cost and the alternative to paying it is to refrain from engaging in this activity, to engage 
in other regulated activity, or continue the practice and risk the consequences of not 
paying the tax. In the first two cases, the coercive power stands in the background of the 
decision and in the last, requires some actual state restraints in respect of the continued 
hunting. There are numerous kinds of taxation which impose the same coercive 
restraints and they are, unless one is an anarcho-capitalist, not prima facie wrong. That 
is, the rightness of a tax will depend on whether the tax is legitimate qua neutrally 
justifiiable. In respect of Raz’s emphasis on autonomy as ‘self-authorship,’ it is difficult 
to see how taxing a particular activity can be justified by reference to the value of 
autonomy if someone is restrained from pursuing the activity for reasons that are not the 
‘right’ reasons, i.e. not self-authored ones but rather state-coercive ones. For Raz himself 
notes that an autonomous decision is undermined also by interfering with the way 
people come to form their particular beliefs about value,85 It also takes the insulting 
characteristic of manipulation, since the agent is treated as incapable of making moral 
decisions independently. Further, if such a justification were capable of being accepted, 
it would nevertheless rely on the same moral merits that the hunter should himself 
consider when deciding to engage in this activity. The underlying point here is as 
Waldron points out, about respect for autonomy, an idea underpinning their broader 
concept;86 in the abovementioned example, autonomy-advancing policies are inevitably 
self-defeating, as an insulting instrument of manipulation, which on Raz’s account does 
not demonstrate a respect for autonomy. I think one would draw the same conclusions 
from an analysis of autonomy-promoting subsidies and, I suggest, a far wider range of 
autonomy-promoting policies that are tacitly advanced by Raz. 
It should be noted here that Mill endorsed imposing taxation on activities that, 
beyond a certain point, are “positively injurious”, since taxation is an inevitable part of 
the state’s revenue raising,87 and if it must tax something, the state might as well choose 
such injurious activities. But at the same time, he acknowledged that such taxation 
differs only in degree from coercive prohibition and should be done to optimize revenue, 
rather than to prohibit the conduct.88 In this sense, we can compare these statements with 
Locke’s famous example of the prohibition on calf slaughter in times of privation, where 
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the reasons for such prohibitions are politically neutral in the sense that they are 
consequent of the privation, not based on prohibiting, say, ritual calf slaughter practiced 
by a particular group, though the effect might not be neutral in the sense that it is more 
prohibitive for that particular group.89 The point I wish to make is that in both 
arguments, the coercive power is justified not by reference to the effect on a particular 
activity, but by the neutral political concern of revenue-raising in the first case and stock 
replenishing in the second.   
 
Between principle and practice 
 
This brings us to the second objection, which asks what is the practical or theoretical 
utility of maintaining allegiance to personal autonomy as a fundamental value of 
liberalism, if is not amenable to achieving its aims through state interference (e.g. 
increased personal autonomy, group-differentiated rights)?  
To avoid being “drawn down the path of interference”90 like the other pro-
autonomy theorists, Kymlicka responds by basing his theory granting group protection 
from external interference but rejecting internal restrictions, or what he identifies as a 
distinction between identifying a liberal theory of minority rights and imposing that 
theory91 and he argues more vigorously than Barry, Raz or Crowder that there is “little 
scope for legitimate interference” in the affairs of national minorities. This is because 
firstly, by analogizing with liberals’ reluctance to interfere with foreign groups, internal 
national groups also form distinct political communities with claims to self-government 
that must be respected. Secondly, the spectre raised by Waldron of ulterior, paternalistic 
or imperialistic motives lurks in the shadows and finally, agreeing with the theme of the 
preceding paragraphs, such interference often backfires.92 So, intervention may be 
justified in circumstances as limited as slavery or genocide, the equivalent justification 
required for international humanitarian intervention. “In the end,” Kymlicka says, 
“liberal institutions can only really work if liberal beliefs have been internalized by 
members of the self-governing society, be it an independent or a national minority.”93 
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Instead he favours a kind of modus vivendi or treaty arrangement between groups if one 
cannot be persuaded to adopt the other’s principles. So, “[I]n cases where the national 
minority is illiberal, this means that the majority will be unable to prevent the violation 
of individual rights within the minority community,” and, crucially, “[L]iberals in the 
majority group have to learn to live with this, just as they must live with illiberal laws in 
other countries.”94 Kymlicka’s insistence that ‘internal restrictions’ are unacceptable 
insofar as they inhibit personal autonomy sits uncomfortably with the above concession. 
What exactly then is the import of his “unrelenting” intolerance of illiberal practices on 
the grounds of personal autonomy if it means that, nonetheless, they must be tolerated 
for other, liberal reasons?  
The problem with this approach is as Kukathas notes, that in sacrificing 
autonomy at the altar of group rights, “it is hard to see what work Kymlicka’s liberal 
principles, emphasizing the importance of autonomy, are doing here”;95 if, despite the 
liberal theory that rejects internal restrictions placed by groups on the civil rights of their 
members, groups nonetheless have almost complete authority over its members. That is, 
if saying that internal restrictions ‘must be rejected’ merely means that they are to be 
disapproved of but nonetheless excused by liberals, it has no practical significance on 
the structure of inter-group relations and hardly seems worth saying, certainly not in 
normative theory. If, on the other hand, it means precisely what it says, then we are 
indeed ‘drawn down the path to interference’ and would it indeed be a Pyrrhic victory 
for groups seeking special recognition of their unique practices. As Simon Clarke notes, 
“it is not clear why [liberal] perfectionism should avoid recommending coercion”96 to 
promote autonomy since, at least to some minimum degree, it seems necessary to give 
effect to its value as a principle. Thus, if the principle upon which we should rely in 
rejecting illiberal internal restrictions, the value of personal autonomy, is to have any 
relevance as a principle, then non-intervention might be excused by reference to 
practical considerations, but non-intervention would not be justified by virtue only of 
those considerations nor the existence other principles, such as the recognition of group-
differentiated rights. 
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Goodin explains the relevance of this distinction thus: “Appeals to excuses admit 
that what is being done is in some sense wrong; they claim merely that, for some special 
sorts of reasons, the wrong is excusable or forgivable one. Even if the wrong is in this 
way “excused”, it is none the less morally unfortunate that it had to be committed at all. 
It would have been morally better for the conditions by virtue of which the wrong was 
excused to have been removed, so the excused wrong did not have to be committed in 
the first place.”97  
Kymlicka’s position is one of ambivalence, that non-intervention is contrary to 
the principle of liberalism, yet is nonetheless excusable. At this point we have reached 
an impasse, the resolution of which is central to the thesis of this work. It is my view 
that Kymlicka’s ambivalence exposes his lack of courage in the doctrine he espouses if 
it has no enforceability and his view is therefore inconsistent and unsustainable as a 
liberal theory. In contrast, the argument expounded here is that the conditions by which 
a wrong need be excused can be removed if non-intervention is justified on the basis of 
liberty of conscience, freedom of association and the principle of toleration, and 
recognizing this as the only really plausible liberal theory. But it is a conclusion that is 
contrary to his liberal principle of promoting personal autonomy. Is personal autonomy 
then a liberal principle at all? 
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this is that promoting personal 
autonomy is not a justifiable principle of liberalism, nor is granting groups any special 
recognition above what the principle of toleration already affords. Rather, the principle 
of non-intervention regrettably espoused as right conduct by Kymlicka is justifiable, as 
the first virtue of liberalism embodied in the principle of toleration. Kymlicka’s 
reluctance to commit to coercive or interventionist policies to promote autonomy 
evidently stems less from the force of principle than from its perceived odious anti-
liberal consequences. Kymlicka fails to see that he must go either toward the 
comprehensive liberal position upholding substantial civil rights based upon personal 
autonomy, or retreat toward the political liberal position, accepting that different groups 
should be allowed to go their own way.  
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5.  TOLERATION: THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM  
 
 
 
 
 
The limits of a theory of toleration 
 
 This work argues that the principle of toleration is the first virtue of a free 
society and its significance lies at the core of liberalism and, in contrast to the 
abovementioned liberal theorists who do not give sufficient weight to it, should not be of 
mere utility for prior moral principles such as personal autonomy or justice. If liberal 
theory is founded on freedom of association and liberty of conscience in the absence of 
moral authority or any established common standpoint, the principle of toleration is not 
merely of instrumental but independent value, because it honours the authority of reason 
in the public sphere by providing an uninhibited marketplace for self-assertion, criticism 
and dissent. Allow me to explain why toleration honours reason and is therefore so 
important. 
 For Kymlicka and Raz as we have seen, and to a lesser extent (both the early and 
later) Rawls, toleration is applicable only up to the point that it is consistent with the 
substantive value of autonomy, claimed to be at the heart of a liberal society’s common 
moral standpoint but which I have so far argued against. Larmore reminds us that 
“Liberalism is thus seen as an ‘art of separation’, opposed to the idea of society as an 
organic whole”;98 it is not its purpose to create liberal citizens, because this is not what 
everyone seeks and may require people to live by standards they do not recognize and 
cannot abide. Rawls, wary of the sectarian value of personal autonomy, upholds 
toleration on the basis of another substantive foundational moral standpoint – justice. 
But whether and how far a practice will be tolerated must be determined by its 
compatibility to this standpoint, which in circumstances of diversity, would surely 
countenance a great deal of intolerance of discordant practices. Toleration in this way 
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serves the end of liberal justice which, according to Rawls “must work out from its own 
point of view how to treat those who dissent from it.”99 The later Rawls assiduously 
recognised that founding principles of justice on personal autonomy could not gain the 
support of many groups in society, presenting his principles of justice in such a way that 
they will command the allegiance of an ‘overlapping consensus’ by appealing to what is 
common amongst diverse substantive moral viewpoints and will therefore preserve 
social unity and stability. But while this kind of political liberalism does not foist upon 
people the values of personal autonomy, it does not either relinquish a commitment to a 
substantive moral ideal of the citizen that must be imposed when in conflict with 
minority views. Thus, Rawls’ political conception of justice would require, for instance, 
that children be educated as future liberal citizens: to be fully cooperative members of 
wider society, aware of their constitutional rights, acquiring the capacity to understand 
the public culture and institutions and encouraged to fulfill the political virtues implicit 
in honouring the political conception of justice.100 He acknowledges that this, “in effect, 
though not in intention” may educate them into a comprehensive liberal conception but 
that these are “unavoidable consequences… [that] may have to be accepted, often with 
regret.”101 In this way, even the later Rawls is not really able to remain abstemious about 
the good and, since his principles of justice presuppose the benefits of autonomy, the 
political institutions are likely to be hostile to non-autonomy supporting ways of life and 
therefore, not justifiable to them.  
 The problem with these positions is not that they are hostile to the concerns of 
minority cultures, which the ‘regret’ evinced by Kymlicka and Rawls plainly shows. The 
problem lies in their honouring a supposed common standpoint of morality, a liberal 
political order in which liberal individuals cooperate. Toleration is afforded to those who 
share that common standpoint, purportedly self-evident or philosophically established, 
not to dissenting views. Indeed, sustaining this common standpoint implies that “[n]o 
independent principle of toleration is required”102, as Fitzmaurice claims. 
 If toleration should be ascribed more importance as I argue, it is not merely to 
accommodate minority cultures who dissent or differ from this liberal political order, 
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though this is indeed one reason to count in its favour as it checks or counters moral 
certitude. In the absence of any authority or mechanism that can establish the correctness 
of one moral standpoint, matters of value are always subject to some reasonable doubt. 
Liberalism’s unique response asserts that the correctness of our convictions appeal not to 
authority but to a universal audience through appeals to reason, by procedures that are 
open, never fixed beyond criticism or revision. If reason is the ‘authority’ that we appeal 
to in public, then toleration is vitally important, because, for its existence, reason 
depends on a public realm of freedom subjecting itself to criticism. As Kant says, should 
reason “limit freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon 
itself suspicion… Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has 
no dictatorial authority; its verdict is simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom 
each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even 
his veto.”103 Kant’s thought indicates that toleration paradigmatically characterizes a 
way of life in which our convictions can be challenged and through the same process, 
vindicated. Reason and toleration are therefore interdependent; the limitation of one is 
the limitation of the other. 
 This is an important conclusion, because in a liberal society there are 
fundamental disputes about the good life and liberalism is characterized by forbearance 
on their resolution. To assume a common moral standpoint from amongst the self-
evident diversity of standpoints is to limit toleration and, therefore, transgress reason’s 
authority. As long as toleration prevails so too does reason, persuasion overrides force. 
The public realm embodies a convergence of different moral standpoints, including 
those that are not responsive to reason. In accepting Kant’s view that honouring reason 
demands a realm of freedom protected by toleration, we recognize this freedom as 
freedom of conscience and, insofar as our convictions remain subject to critical scrutiny 
rather than the authority of force, reason is not undermined if it is spurned. 
 
Practical limits 
  
The thesis of this work argues that any and all groups willing to uphold the principle of 
toleration and freedom of conscience and association ought to be tolerated, constrained 
in practice only by norms arising from their continued allegiance to the modus vivendi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
103 Kant, I., The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, St Martin’s, London, 1970, p. 593 
 46 
political settlement. The state is, therefore, indifferent to the kind and number of groups 
that form it, and unconcerned with their survival. The political community is then, 
mutable and much less stable than liberal nationalists hope for and this is an important 
point, for they see this as a threat to the very existence of the community, from outside 
or from within. 
But attempting to circumscribe toleration for this reason is a precarious business. 
For example, Rawls’ limits his ‘overlapping consensus’ to only reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines the but his theoretical criteria of ‘reasonableness’ seemingly 
disparages both those doctrines Rawls says ought justifiably be excluded and those 
central to his whole motivation and purpose - major religions104. The same problem is 
present with Larmore, who distinguishes between “reasonable disagreements” within the 
realm of rational conversation implicit in a modus vivendi approach and other 
disagreements, based on arguments rather than faith, which presumably fall outside and 
are presumably to be disregarded.105 Nussbaum, trying to reconcile Rawls’ views with 
the moral grounding of political liberalism in equal respect, interpreted toleration as 
extending up to but not including doctrines that are in some obvious way silly or 
irrational.106 Trying to resolve the problem in these ways seems to be a kind of 
intellectual folly that ultimately misses the point, if toleration is independently valuable. 
Kukathas is far more accommodating than other political liberals, stating that 
“[I]t is enough simply for them not to object to coexistence… which we should respect 
only to the extent that ‘innovation’ threatens to produce something worse.”107 His view 
holds, I think rightly, that if groups on the fringes can no longer sustain living within a 
political community whose norms proscribe their values, nothing except the opportunity 
costs involved should preclude them from making their case to secede. Secession is by 
no means a simple solution and we may think this a good thing, for nothing is surer to 
guarantee the civil peace than a compromise so as to remain a party to it. 
But Kukathas leaves unexamined the question of groups who not only object to 
the terms of coexistence but to coexistence of diversity itself, who aim at unifying the 
broader community according to their moral standpoint rather than themselves seceding 
and who intend to employ the apparatus of state power to do so. This is a serious 
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problem for a regime of toleration if it has no response to threats to its very existence, a 
problem which Kukathas either has not seen or has evaded because, ultimately, it 
demands either setting some limit to toleration, thereby possibly undermining the 
authority of reason, or countenancing liberalism’s Achilles’ heel and existential end. 
In response to this challenge, I argue that liberalism is not so existentially 
vulnerable, and its defense is its strength: the principle of toleration itself. The principle 
implies that groups seeking to undermine the principle of toleration or peaceable 
coexistence ought to be the constrained, because doing so upholds toleration and 
therefore, reason. It would be absurd to tolerate groups who seek to capture the power of 
the state to undermine the principles founding it by promoting their particular values. As 
Rawls notes, “the job of a liberal society must be one “of containing [such doctrines] – 
like war and disease – so that they don’t overturn political justice.”108 It would be 
contrary to reason that the realm of public reason itself was overrun by force, even 
where that force was exercised democratically as, for example, in Hitler’s rise to power. 
For while liberalism and democracy are natural bedfellows, the latter serves the former, 
and one should not forget Winston Churchill’s epigram that democracy is just the worst 
form of government except all the others that have been tried. 
An important qualification to make however, is that the means of containment is 
an empirical question answered in the rules governing the civil peace that the political 
community agree upon and change from time to time. If an appeal to toleration is the 
basis of such a defense, then there is no reason to expand the theory of toleration to 
accommodate its implicit limitations, though what those limitations would be remains 
conjecture. We must tread carefully that we do not grant to the state too wide a license to 
ban or suppress groups, for once we grant the state such power (As was the case in 
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth of Australia in 1951109) we confer on the 
state a great deal too much power to define for its own purposes what constitutes a 
legitimate threat, or to dictate to groups what beliefs are acceptable.  
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6.  CONCLUSION  
 
  
 
The natural tendency toward diversity and disagreement belongs at the center of liberal 
thought. I have so far argued at length that the fundamental goal of liberalism is not the 
development of liberal citizens but recognition of the individual character of our moral 
sense, and our interest in living according to its dictates. Our rationalist intellectual 
tradition has to a large extent committed us to the idea that reason leads naturally to 
agreement, and through reason we can be brought into closer harmony. This work has 
challenged that idea and instead focused on how reason brings us instead to a political 
compromise, but a kind of compromise where our deeper moral commitments remain 
ultra vires, which is the limit of the practical best. This is embodied in a principle of 
toleration restored to a central position in liberal theory. 
Liberalism does not grant the state or society any more wisdom to judge the truth 
or falsehood of a belief; it secures a framework within which individuals may judge and 
act for themselves as responsible and respected citizens and where disagreements arise, 
the goal of the state is to keep the peace, to keep the conversation going by withdrawing 
to neutral ground, rather than appealing to more substantive moral ideals like autonomy 
or justice or to practical considerations such as stability or unity. A liberal individual’s 
duty may be to improve his own condition by gaining knowledge and experience of the 
world to better inform himself of his good and he may see to it that others come to learn 
the value of this through the power of his persuasion. But a liberal political theory does 
not sanctify this duty. It cannot, without trading away what is most important to us as 
humans: to live according to our own lights. Rather, it sets rules by which an individual 
is free to talk and hear but not duty-bound to listen or follow. Any more than this, and 
liberalism risks becoming just another sectarian doctrine.   
Kymlicka and other comprehensive liberals have sought to reconcile the plight of 
long-suffering dissenting minorities by fostering liberal equality founded on the value of 
personal autonomy, under the guardianship of a state who must, they argue, take an 
active interest in issues not only of culture, but education for citizenship, language, 
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political boundaries and immigration. It is right that liberals should be sympathetic to the 
plight of the oppressed where it results from an asymmetry of power, but a liberal theory 
goes wrong if it assumes that it is the state’s duty to make society more healthy, noble, 
equal or more just. The true aim of the state, as Spinoza says, is liberty, and it fulfils this 
aim by providing a form of security that is consonant with liberty, resisting taking an 
interest in the goals and ends of people or groups. It achieves this by acting to prevent 
lawlessness, whether from external threats or from threats that come from within. It is 
not for it to decide which ways of life will survive and which are to disappear, which 
groups should be granted status and which should be assimilated. There is nothing about 
the state that makes it capable of knowing which standards of social justice are to prevail 
in circumstances where those standards are in dispute. Its role is to preserve order so that 
people might continue the debate. 
The power invested in the state makes its control in favour of one view or 
another very appealing and for this reason, it is not enough for liberal theory to say that 
the state must be neutral and leave it at that. It cannot but be a moral agent, with its own 
interests, dominated by agents with their own particular interests too. But we should 
view with a great deal of skepticism the idea that the state should therefore play an 
active role in the cultural marketplace. The experience of history tells us in plain terms 
that intervention has not always been benign. Once people differentiated themselves 
from one another in terms of beliefs, goals and identity, the possibility of a 
thoroughgoing equality became impossible; the pursuit of equality will, at best, create 
new inequalities elsewhere and can be sustained only by employing a high degree of 
coercive power, against which there is little respite if is wrongly applied. Power tends to 
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.  
The stance presented in this work suggests not that nothing can or needs to be 
done in circumstances of disagreement or to rectify historical injustice but that there is, 
in most cases, no determinate solution that will conform to or satisfy an ideal. A liberal 
should recognize immediately that such demands cannot be persuasive if they come 
through the exercise of state power rather than reasoned principle. Therefore, if diversity 
is accepted as a matter of fact, then we must be wary of the promotion of certain values 
or the idea cultural construction generally and have to accept the both the limited, liberal 
ideal of non-interventionist toleration and also the consequences, the domination of 
some traditions and the disappearance of others. We do not live in an ideal, but a real, 
ever-changing world. 
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